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LEARNING TO LIVE WITH JUDICIAL PARTISANSHIP: A 
RESPONSE TO CASSANDRA BURKE ROBERTSON 
Bruce A. Green and Rebecca Roiphe 
In November 2018, Chief Justice John Roberts defended the federal 
judiciary in response to President Trump’s tweet attacking a so-called 
“Obama judge” in California who blocked an executive order placing 
restrictions on asylum seekers.1 The Chief Justice asserted that, “We do 
not have Obama judges or Trump judges, Bush judges or Clinton judges. 
What we have is an extraordinary group of dedicated judges doing their 
level best to do equal right to those appearing before them.”2 
Unpersuaded, President Trump tweeted back, “Sorry Chief Justice John 
Roberts, but you do indeed have ‘Obama judges,’ and they have a much 
different point of view than the people who are charged with the safety 
of our country.”3 
As is often true in public debates, it matters how you define your 
terms. President Trump may have been partly right if his point was that 
different federal judges have different views about how best to interpret 
and apply the law, and that their judicial philosophies tend to align with 
their political or ideological preferences—that is, Republican appointees 
tend to be more “conservative” and Democratic appointees tend to be 
more “liberal” in their approach to the law.4 Although one cannot predict 
with certainty how any given judge will decide any individual question, 
one can often identify who is more or less likely to be sympathetic to 
certain legal arguments and positions. Studies confirm that, on 
contentious legal questions, ideology matters—that on average, federal 
judges decide differently depending on whether they were appointed by 
a Republican or Democratic president.5 That is why the Federalist Society 
 
 1. Katie Reilly, President Trump Escalates Attacks on ‘Obama Judges’ After Rare Rebuke 
From Chief Justice, TIME (Nov. 21, 2018), http://time.com/5461827/donald-trump-judiciary-
chief-justice-john-roberts/ [https://perma.cc/M2M8-G5SY].  
 2. Id. For a skeptical response, see Take Roberts Court Defense with a Grain of Salt, 
ALLIANCE FOR JUST. (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.afj.org/blog/take-roberts-court-defense-with-
a-grain-of-salt [https://perma.cc/MG7R-ZD86].  
 3. Reilly, supra note 1. 
 4. See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judicial Impartiality in a Partisan Era, 70 FLA. L. 
REV. 739, 767–68 (2018).  
 5. See, e.g., Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Ideology “All the Way Down”? An 
Empirical Study of Establishment Clause Decisions in the Federal Courts, 110 MICH. L. REV. 
1201, 1259–60 (2012); see also Lawrence Hurley, Obama’s judges leave liberal imprint on U.S. 
law, REUTERS (Aug. 16, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-obama/obamas-
judges-leave-liberal-imprint-on-u-s-law-idUSKCN1110BC [https://perma.cc/27AA-KBZJ] 
(discussing that Obama’s judicial appointments titled the judiciary in a liberal direction). For an 
empirical study of how judges decide cases, see Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How 
Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3 (2007) (concluding that judges make intuitive 
snap judgements but sometimes override these decisions after deliberating).  
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recommends and supports President Trump’s judicial nominees,6 while 
liberal interests groups oppose many of them.7 In the voting booth, the 
public understands that it matters who appoints judges.  
On the other hand, the Chief Justice was right insofar as his point was 
that federal judges are not beholden to the president who appointed them; 
they are not expected consciously to favor the parties and legal positions 
identified with that president or with that president’s party.8 For example, 
in deciding a legal challenge to an executive order, a federal judge should 
bring the same philosophical and interpretive predispositions to bear 
regardless of whether the president who issued the order was a 
Republican or Democrat. While political ideology plays a role in judicial 
decision-making, it does not directly determine the outcome of cases.9 
Judges look to precedent and employ various interpretive techniques and 
accepted forms of legal reasoning.  
In her article, Judicial Impartiality in a Partisan Era,10 Professor 
Cassandra Burke Robertson stakes out a middle ground between these 
two conceptions.11 She suggests that even if judges make a conscious 
effort not to decide cases based on partisan political identification, they 
may unconsciously bring their partisan views to bear.12 Doing so may be 
unavoidable.13 Social scientists tell us, for example, that when sports fans 
view disputed plays, they perceive them more favorably to the team for 
which they are rooting—and neuroscientists tell us that there is a neural 
basis for their different perceptions.14 While judges are professionals, and 
 
 6. See Sophie McBain, Who are the Federalist Society? Inside the right-wing group 
picking Trump’s Supreme Court judges, NEW STATESMAN (Sept. 7, 2018), 
https://www.newstatesman.com/world/north-america/2018/09/who-are-federalist-society-inside-
right-wing-group-picking-trump-s [https://perma.cc/KSQ3-8AGF].  
 7. See, e.g., Judicial Nominees, ALL. FOR JUST., https://www.afj.org/our-
work/issues/judicial-nominees [https://perma.cc/N242-NHBC].  
 8. Guthrie et al., supra note 5, at 3–4 (explaining how hunches and intuitive responses do 
not alone determine judicial decisions). Regardless of expectations, some contend that, at the 
highest levels, judges do in fact tend to decide cases on political party lines, regardless of whether 
the decision conforms to the judge’s general judicial philosophy. E.g., Sheldon Whitehouse, Sen. 
Whitehouse: There’s a ‘Crisis of Credibility’ at the U.S. Supreme Court, NAT’L L.J. (Feb. 15, 
2019), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2019/02/15/sen-whitehouse-theres-a-crisis-of-
credibility-at-the-u-s-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/F9WL-HAD9] (charging that the 
decisions of Republican appointees on the U.S. Supreme Court demonstrate an “undeniable 
pattern of political allegiance. Under [Chief Justice] Roberts, justices appointed by Republican 
presidents have, with remarkable consistency, delivered rulings that advantage big corporate and 
special interests that are, in turn, the political lifeblood of the Republican party.”).  
 9. Guthrie et al., supra note 5, at 2–3. 
 10. Robertson, supra note 4.  
 11.  See id. at 739. 
 12.   See id. at 767. 
 13.  Id. 
 14. See TIMOTHY J. ANDREWS ET AL., NEURAL CORRELATES OF GROUP BIAS DURING 
NATURAL VIEWING 1 (2018). 
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may make a stronger effort than sports fans to be impartial, unconscious 
preferences likely influence their perceptions, too. For example, if the 
roles were reversed in Bush v. Gore,15 and Al Gore had won the initial 
count in Florida, are we confident that five Republican-appointed Justices 
would have voted to end George W. Bush’s legal challenge?16 
Professor Robertson sees it as a problem worth redressing that judges 
may be influenced—or appear to be influenced—by “political bias” in 
ways unseen by observers and unperceived by judges themselves.17 The 
problem involves the nature of judging and the legitimacy of courts in a 
highly partisan age. Professor Robertson is aware that this is not a new 
problem but argues that the increasingly polarized partisan climate calls 
for a new response.18 She acknowledges that the problem cannot 
effectively be solved by disqualifying partisan judges because all judges 
have partisan affiliations and political and ideological sympathies.19 
Moreover, it would be impossible to untangle political sympathies from 
judicial philosophies and policy preferences; the latter are not only 
unavoidable but desirable in a judge.20 Professor Robertson proposes 
various other procedural responses instead.21  
The most significant response, one that Professor Robertson does not 
advance, would be to change how judges are selected. In most U.S. 
jurisdictions, judges are either appointed by an elected official, as in the 
case of Article III federal judges, or are themselves elected. There are 
other ways to choose judges, however, that avoid or reduce partisan 
political influence.22 For example, federal magistrate judges, who are 
 
 15. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).  
 16. Compare Nelson Lund, “Equal Protection My Ass!”? Bush v. Gore and Laurence 
Tribe's Hall of Mirrors, 19 CONST. COMM. 543, 545, 556 (2002) (defending the Court’s decision), 
Nelson Lund, The Unbearable Rightness of  Bush v. Gore, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1219, 1219 
(2002) (defending the Court’s decision), and Ronald D. Rotunda, Yet Another Article on Bush v. 
Gore, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 283, 287 (2003) (defending the Court’s decision), with Jack M. Balkin, 
Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 1407, 1408 (2001) 
(“That the conservative Justices acted as they did suggested that their partisanship was so 
thorough and pervasive that it blinded them to their own biases.”), and Michael S. Kang & Joanna 
M. Shepherd, The Long Shadow of Bush v. Gore: Judicial Partisanship in Election Cases, 68 
STAN. L. REV. 1411, 1424 (2016) (“[T]he partisanship of the many judges and political actors in 
the 2000 postelection process uncannily predicted their decision-making for and against Bush and 
Gore.”). 
 17. See Robertson, supra note 4, at 756–64.  
 18.   See id. at 756–57. 
 19. See id. at 767–69. 
 20. See Bruce A. Green, May Judges Attend Privately Funded Educational Programs? 
Should Judicial Education Be Privatized?: Questions of Judicial Ethics and Policy, 29 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 941, 965–67 (2002) (quoting and citing authority). 
 21. See Robertson, supra note 4, at 769–75. 
 22. For a small sample of the literature comparing different methods of judicial selection in 
the United States, see, e.g., Hon. Diane M. Johnsen, Building A Bench: A Close Look At State 
Appellate Courts Constructed By The Respective Methods Of Judicial Selection, 53 SAN DIEGO 
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selected by the federal judiciary, are less likely than Article III judges to 
be perceived as politically partisan.23 An even more nonpartisan selection 
process is employed in countries where judging is a profession separate 
from the practice of law.24 In legal systems where law graduates 
immediately join, and then remain in, a judicial bureaucracy, judges are 
unlikely to be identified with, or beholden to, a particular political party 
throughout their judicial careers.25  
We are not persuaded that such a radical change or Professor 
Robertson’s more minor suggestions are needed, however. While we 
agree that judges, as humans, are subject to all kinds of unconscious 
thought processes, which likely include partisan identification, we are 
less disposed than Professor Robertson to see this as a problem worth 
redressing. We acknowledge social science teachings about unconscious 
biases, including pernicious ones such as unconscious racial biases. But 
we tend to think that judges’ humanity, including their unconscious 
irrationalities and other human frailties, should simply be accepted, and 
that we ought to focus on whether judges’ conscious decision-making 
processes, including their express thought processes, adhere to 
professional expectations. If so, we need not worry too much about what 
 
L. REV. 829, 832–33 (2016) (reviewing five methods of selecting state appellate judges—partisan 
election, nonpartisan election, legislative selection, merit selection, and “merit-confirmation”); 
Phyllis Williams Kotey, Public Financing for Non-partisan Judicial Campaigns, 38 AKRON L. 
REV. 597, 598–99 (2005) (arguing that public funding of nonpartisan judicial elections will better 
promote judicial independence and nonpartisanship than partisan judicial elections or judicial 
appointments); Steven Zeidman, To Elect or Not to Elect: A Case Study of Judicial Selection in 
New York City 1977-2000, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 791, 791 (2004) (concluding that elected 
judges are more beholden to interest groups than appointed judges).   
 23. See Christopher E. Smith, Merit Selection Committees and the Politics of Appointing 
United States Magistrates, 12 JUST. SYS. J. 210, 229–30 (1987). 
 24. See John O. Haley, Judicial Reform: Conflicting Aims and Imperfect Models, 5 WASH. 
U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 81, 93 (2006) (discussing civil law systems where “judges are members 
of an elite corps of civil servants in one or more specialized ‘judicial service’ bureaucracies”). In 
common law countries (other than the United States) where judges are generally selected to the 
bench by other judges and serve for substantial periods of time without expectation of promotion, 
there is also less partisanship than in the United States. See id. at 91 (“[A]s judicial selection in 
the United States occurs either through the electoral process or by political appointment, political 
accountability is assured but partisan politics necessarily permeates the selection and above all 
retention processes.”). 
 25. This is not to say, however, that judicial bureaucracies better promote judicial 
independence. On the contrary, where judges’ impartiality is secured through bureaucratic, rather 
than democratic, accountability, judges may be more susceptible to inappropriate executive and 
bureaucratic influence. See generally Neil Chisholm, The Faces of Judicial Independence: 
Democratic versus Bureaucratic Accountability in Judicial Selection, Training, and Promotion 
in South Korea and Taiwan, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 893 (2014) (analyzing the two different 
approaches to judicial independence). It is simply to say that judges who come up the ranks of 
judicial bureaucracies are likely to be less susceptible to political-party influence and to be less 
likely to identify, or appear to identify, with a political party.  
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lies below the surface.26 
We have previously written in praise (within limits) of judges’ 
reliance on emotion—another unconscious, or at least non-rational, 
thought process.27 Trial judges in particular are often personally affected 
by the participants and the drama in their courtrooms. Appellate judges, 
commentators, and scholars have, at times, chastised them for emotional 
outbursts, suggesting that these displays are inconsistent with the role of 
the judge. In contrast, we argue that emotional entanglement is not only 
consistent with good judging, but it can also help judges manage their 
courtrooms, empathize with litigants, and reach appropriate decisions. 
Unlike emotional responses, unconscious partisan bias is not a useful 
judicial trait. But it is no less a product of who we are as human beings.  
Judicial decision-making is complicated. The fact that judges have 
implicit biases, including biases correlating to partisan preferences and 
political identification, does not mean that their implicit biases 
necessarily have a significant role in judicial decision-making. When 
evaluating self-interests and biases that might undermine a judge’s 
professional judgment, one should acknowledge countervailing 
incentives and influences. Judges may be motivated by professional 
values such as fairness, consistency, and impartiality that largely offset 
their unconscious biases. Ideally, judges’ commitment to norms of 
impartial decision-making is reinforced insofar as their judicial peers, the 
legal profession, or the public at large review their work and measure it 
against these values. Particularly at the appellate level, judges have a 
burden of justification—they must write opinions that satisfy norms of 
judicial reasoning—and their justifications are scrutinized. If 
professional pride does not influence judges to seek to avoid partisan bias, 
then their self-interest in their professional reputation may do so.  
Although unconscious political partisanship probably cannot be offset 
entirely, it should not necessarily be identified as a particular cause of 
concern. Judges, as humans, are subject to the potential influence of a 
host of implicit biases, of which political partisanship is but one.28 The 
 
 26. Our conclusions accord with those of empirical legal scholars who conclude that it is 
not necessarily bad for judges to rely on intuition, even though intuition can include an 
uncomfortable mix of bias and well-trained instinctual or common-sense responses. The key is to 
empower judges to reject their worst instincts when possible. See Guthrie et al., supra note 5, at 
33–41. 
 27. See Bruce Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Judicial Activism in Trial Courts, NYU ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. (forthcoming 2018); Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Regulating Discourtesy 
on the Bench: A Study in the Evolution of Judicial Independence, 64 NYU ANN. SURV. AM. L. 
497, 498–99 (2008). 
 28.   See Understanding Implicit Bias, KIRWAN INST. FOR THE STUDY OF RACE AND 
ETHNICITY, OHIO ST. U., http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/research/understanding-implicit-bias/ 
[https://perma.cc/8P6H-8BGD] (providing examples of implicit bias such as race, ethnicity, age 
and appearance) 
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ideal of some pure judicial core motivated only by reason is a myth not 
worth pursuing.  
Professor Robertson is clearly aware of the complexity of human 
thought and judicial decision-making, rejecting caricatures of judges as 
completely impartial or entirely motivated by partisan bias.29 On the one 
hand, there is President Trump’s view of judges as political actors 
dressing up partisan ideology in judicial language.30 On the other, Chief 
Justice Roberts has portrayed judges as rational and the law as readily 
discernible.31 Well before he rebuked President Trump’s twitter attack on 
“Obama judges,” Chief Justice Roberts avowed at his confirmation 
hearings that his job as a judge was “to call balls and strikes and not to 
pitch or bat.”32 Professor Robertson acknowledges that judging inevitably 
falls somewhere in between these two extremes.  
Professor Robertson prudently embraces Professor Charles Geyh’s 
goal of “impartial enough” judging, reminiscent of the 1950s popular 
slogan of the “good enough mother.”33 Professor Geyh acknowledges that 
because society now accepts the premises of legal realism and the 
inevitable role of personal and political interests in judging, it is illogical 
to argue that judges are entirely impartial.34 Bias is inevitable and 
acceptable as long as it does not push the judge out of the range of what 
we all recognize as legitimate judicial reasoning. Having dispensed with 
the mythical extremes of judging encompassed by the pronouncements 
of both Chief Justice Roberts and President Trump, what remains is a 
different concept of what it means to be a judge and a different sense of 
when that person’s impartiality ought to be reasonably questioned. A 
political view, partisan attachments, even a personal relationship with a 
powerful political actor, should not necessarily be regarded as 
disqualifying considerations.  
Professor Robertson revisits this issue at an important time. She 
argues persuasively that the increasingly polarized nature of political life 
makes her subject more pressing.35 Citing social science data, she 
 
 29.  See Robertson, supra note 4, at 762. 
 30.  See Reilly, supra note 1. 
 31. See id. 
 32.   Roberts: ‘My job is to call balls and strikes and not to pitch or bat’, CNN (Sept. 12, 
2005), http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/09/12/roberts.statement/ [https://perma.cc/6XTN-
PM6K]. 
 33. The term was coined by British Psychologist D.W. Winnicott to refer to mothers who 
gradually withdraw from their children and do not attend to their every need. See D.W. 
WINNICOTT, PLAYING AND REALITY 10 (1971). The idea is that the imperfection is what makes for 
a good mother.  
 34. Charles Gardner Geyh, The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, 65 FLA. L. REV. 493, 
504–05 (2013). 
 35. See Robertson, supra note 4, at 751–52. 
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explains that the public believes that judges can remain impartial but that, 
in politically sensitive cases, people equate impartiality with outcomes 
that correspond with their own political views.36 Meanwhile, the public 
is more polarized, less likely to agree with those from other parties, and 
more insulated in and assured of its own ideology.37 Political groups like 
the Heritage Foundation have consciously recruited young lawyers to 
their cause and prepared future judicial clerks in a judicial philosophy 
that leads to consistently conservative rulings.38  
All of this may make it harder to persuade the public that President 
Trump is wrong about judges. Without faith in the judiciary, the 
legitimacy of the courts is placed in jeopardy and the rule of law itself is 
put at risk. But Professor Robertson’s own data provides some comfort. 
The public does trust the courts. Of course, those on both sides of the 
aisle rail in indignation when a decision does not go their way. But, as 
she argues, they accept the ruling and abide by it, albeit reluctantly. Even 
if judges are doing politics by other means, the way they do it matters. 
They use certain forms of reasoning, abide by certain rules, and adhere to 
formal and informal traditions. While the public may be skeptical about 
whether this process prevails over a completely outcome-oriented 
partisan determination in any given case, the public is more or less 
accepting of this fact as a general matter.  
If Professor Robertson is right that the legitimacy of the judiciary is at 
greater risk than it has been in the past, a premise we are not sure we 
share, her proposed changes may not be an adequate solution. She 
proposes using the jury and the appellate system as a check on 
impermissible bias at the trial level, but the kind of political bias that she 
discusses tends to have a greater effect at the appellate level, especially 
in the Supreme Court, where her proposed solutions would not apply.39  
Professor Robertson has two suggestions relating to recusal. She 
argues that each litigant should have one peremptory challenge to 
eliminate a judge, a solution that eighteen states have implemented.40 
First, like the jury and appellate system, this system of judicial challenges 
tends to apply in trial court settings where the problem of partisan bias is 
least severe. The other problem with this proposal is that it risks 
 
 36.  Id. at 764. 
 37. But see Tim Wu, The Oppression of the Supermajority, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/05/opinion/oppression-majority.html 
[https://perma.cc/C4GW-B2ZX] (arguing that the defining problem of our time is not polarization 
and, in fact, the vast majority of the public tends to agree about many important issues).  
 38. See Adam Liptak, Conservative Heritage Foundation Revives Training Academy for 
Future Clerks, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2018) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/21/us/politics/heritage-foundation-clerks-training-
academy.html [https://perma.cc/EUG2-SNUX].  
 39. See Whitehouse, supra note 8. 
 40. Robertson, supra note 4, at 771.  
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importing a host of problems of peremptory challenges in the jury context 
into judicial selection.41 Peremptory challenges have been regulated in 
such a way that their use can reinforce rather than eliminate bias in the 
system.42 Courts that adopt a peremptory challenge for judges would risk 
introducing these problems without necessarily solving the problem of 
perceived or actual partisan bias, especially since some jurisdictions will 
have a high concentration of judges of a particular political bent. Finally, 
Professor Robertson suggests more explicit rules for recusal.43 The 
standards, she argues, are so nebulous that judges rarely recuse and often 
feel personally insulted if asked to do so.44 Specific guidelines could be 
useful, but it is hard to imagine which rules would effectively address 
partisan bias. Would dinner with a political candidate suffice for recusal, 
or a close personal relationship with a politician? In our view, partisan 
bias is so deeply entangled with valuable life experience, intuition, and 
judgment that it would be hard to find rules that eliminated partisan bias 
effectively.  
Further, judicial institutions can endeavor to reduce the negative 
influence of judges’ implicit partisan bias by educating judges about, and 
making them aware of, their biases, while at the same time teaching 
techniques to promote impartial judicial decision-making.45 Intuitions, 
infused as they are with partisan and other biases, may not be a bad place 
to start as long as judges are trained to check their instincts by deliberately 
employing these accepted processes. To compete with efforts of entities 
such as the Heritage Foundation to influence judges and their law 
 
 41. See Nancy J. King, Batson for the Bench: Regulating the Peremptory Challenge of 
Judges, 73 CHI-KENT L REV. 509, 509–10 (1998). For criticisms based on efficiency and other 
concerns see Stephen B. Burbank, Unwarranted Distrust of Federal Judges, 81 J. AM. 
JUDICATURE SOC. 7, 41 (1997). 
 42. For criticism of the Supreme Court’s approach to eliminating bias in peremptory 
challenges, see, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, 
Peremptory Challenges and The Review of Jury Verdicts 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 156–57 (1989); 
David C. Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A Legal and 
Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3, 44–46 (2001); Jeffrey S. Brand, The Supreme Court, 
Equal Protection and Jury Selection: Denying That Race Still Matters, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 511, 
524 (1994); Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection: Professional 
Misconduct, Not Legitimate Advocacy, 22 REV. LITIG. 209, 214 (2003). 
 43.  Robertson, supra note 4, at 770. 
 44.   See id. at 760. 
 45. In other contexts, the profession has strived for a more equal, and less biased, 
profession. E.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 485 (2019) 
(explaining that it violates the code of judicial conduct for judges who perform marriages to refuse 
to perform marriages for same sex couples); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. 
BAR ASS’N, Discussion Draft 1983) (establishing that it is professional misconduct to engage in 
conduct “that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is harassment or discrimination on the 
basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender 
identity, marital status or socioeconomic status in conduct related to the practice of law”).  
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clerks,46 the federal Judicial Conference and its state counterparts could 
institute training for judges that focuses on professionalism.47 They 
would not, of course, teach judges that political views and ideology ought 
to play no role, but they might be able to highlight the judicial processes 
and traditions that tend to minimize the role that bias may play in 
influencing the outcome of cases.48 Understanding the social science and 
legal philosophy of the past century that explains the inevitability of bias 
in decision-making might help judges to acknowledge and minimize its 
influence. The myth perpetuated by Chief Justice Roberts and others of a 
pure judicial philosophy may ironically allow judges to draw more 
heavily on their partisan tendencies while masking their decisions in 
neutral language.  
Of course, both informal and formal efforts at professional 
socialization have their limits. Future judges are not necessarily trained 
to value and exercise impartiality, since most are members of the 
practicing bar where the dominant ethos is one of partisanship. As noted, 
lawyers may be appointed or elected to serve as judges precisely because 
of their partisan identification. Once they join the bench, many judges 
(especially federal judges) perform their work relatively autonomously, 
fairly independent of the judicial bureaucracy—indeed, judicial 
independence is highly valued. They may be somewhat inured to judicial 
socialization.49 And the public may not necessarily value and praise 
exercises in impartiality. The very same outside organizations that 
 
 46. The federal Judicial Conference’s Committee on Codes of Conduct recently published 
an opinion identifying considerations relevant to whether, under applicable codes of conduct, 
judges, law clerks, and future law clerks may properly attend privately-sponsored educational 
programs. See U.S. COURTS, COMMITTEE ON CODES OF CONDUCT ADVISORY OPINION NO. 116 
(2019), available at  https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/vol02b-ch02.pdf.. For an 
argument that the existing judicial regulatory rules do not adequately address privatized judicial 
education, see Green, supra note 20, at 1000–05 (arguing that privatized judicial education 
“pose[s] a risk not only to public confidence in the integrity of individual judges, which judicial 
ethics regulation addresses reasonably well, but also a risk to public confidence in the judiciary 
as an institution. Judicial regulation fails to take account of the latter problem, created by the 
aggregation of potentially small influences on individual judges.”).  
 47. The Judicial Conference was created in 1922 with the goal of rationalizing and 
improving the administration of justice. William W. Shwarzer, The Federal Judicial Center and 
the Administration of Justice in the Federal Courts, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1129, 1131 (1995). In 
the 1950s, the Judicial Conference undertook new research and training projects, including 
implementing an orientation program for new judges. Id. at 1132. In 1966, the Judicial Conference 
proposed legislation that passed the following year, creating a Judicial Center, which would focus 
on education and training of court personnel. See id. at 1132–33.  
 48. Others have suggested related mechanisms for helping judges check their instincts and 
reduce improper bias. See Guthrie et al., supra note 5, at 33–43 (suggesting, among other things, 
more time to deliberate, more requirements about written opinions, and checklists). 
 49. Cf. Haley, supra note 24, at 90 (“[C]ommon experience and the elite nature of the 
English-styled judiciary in turn strengthen the effectiveness of peer pressures (social disapproval) 
as a mechanism to control individual judicial behavior.”).  
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promote partisanship in the judicial selection process may give positive 
reinforcement to judges who make decisions that accord with the 
particular organizations’ partisan preferences. Not only that, but certain 
accepted judicial philosophies, such as originalism, have come to be 
virtually synonymous with a particular ideological agenda. This makes 
disentangling inappropriate partisan impulses from acceptable judicial 
behavior even harder.50 Part of the appeal of originalism is that it purports 
to remove subjectivity from judicial decision-making, but like all judicial 
reasoning it inevitably fails to do so.51 
Finally, the bar, the media, and educational institutions need to do a 
better job of educating the public about judges and their role in upholding 
the rule of law. It is widely accepted in the academy, and among lawyers 
themselves, that ideology inevitably plays a role in judicial decision- 
making. It is less clear how well the public understands this. Warped 
expectations and understanding of judges may contribute to the public 
reaction Professor Robertson describes. President Trump’s and Chief 
Justice Roberts’s overly-simplified characterizations of judicial decision-
making dominate public discourse, leaving little room for a more nuanced 
understanding of the judiciary. Perhaps the outrage and crisis in 
legitimacy that Professor Robertson describes would be mitigated if the 
public were to have a more sophisticated understanding of what judges 
actually do.52 One silver lining of the current political climate is that the 
public commentary about courts and justice provides just such a civics 
lesson. While the exchange between the President and Chief Justice was 
reductive, it nonetheless focused the public attention on a largely ignored 
question—how do and should judges make decisions? If the public is 
primed to listen and judges are better trained in how to act and how to 
educate litigants, juries, and spectators, the fear of politics co-opting the 
judicial branch could be allayed if not eliminated.  
 
 50. See Saul Cornell, Originalism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 625, 626, 630 (2008); Mark Tushnet, Heller and the New 
Originalism, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 609, 610, 617 (2008). 
 51. See Tushnet, supra note 50, at 617. 
 52. Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law’s 
Politics, 148 U. PENN. L. REV. 971, 977–80 (2000) (arguing that the crisis in the legitimacy of the 
courts or the level of concern for the countermajoritarian power of courts can be affected by 
changing expectations about the function of the judiciary and the role of judicial review).  
